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[L. A. No. 19800. In Bank. June 24, 1947.]

of FLORENCE LENORE VAN DEUSEN, Deceasad.
GLADYS VAN DEUSEN BRIGHT et ai., Respondents,
v. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND
. SAVINGS ASSOCIATION. Appellant.
,
) 'l'rusta-Execution-lnstructions as to Administration - PeU.. tion-Hearing.-Although a petition of beneficiaries of a testa:. mentary trust for instructions to the trustee respectin~ pay. menta of income for their support may be filed before the
appointment of a trustee and before the decree of distribution,
the probate court has jurisdiction to hear the petition after
the appointment of a trustee, an order of ratable distribution,
appearance of the trustee to contest the granting of the
sought.
Estates-Final Distribution-Decree-Oonclusivedecree of distribution is a dnal and conclusive con"'ai:rnclticln of the will as against all interested parties, including
~~etlcsiaJ1es of a testamentary trust.
lei. - New 'trial. - Prob. Code, § 1231, relating to new
in probate proceedings, does not authorize the probate
to grant a new trial on a petition for directions to a
.
trustee after the petition had been denied and
of distribution was made.
'DI..-'LTIlU b7 J1117.-There is no right to demand a jury trial
probate proceeding unless that right is granted by statute.
1~'D1"-EJQI!:esa 'lruBts-Mocilllcation.-A court of equity may
a trust on a proper showing of changed conditions
;Merurri!ur after the creating of a trust if the rights of all the
'IItitleflciILriE!S may be protected.
• ;';"'lbJmtlss 'trnsts--Modi1lcation.-Assuming that a probate
has the power to modify a testamentary trust under
Code, § 1120, an order granting a petition of beneficiaries
trust tor instructions to the trustee respecting payments
of income is erroneons where it provides tor an invasion
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of distribution as res judicata as to construction Q!
A.L.B. 1180, 1185. See, also, lIB Cal.Jur. 787; 21

53 Am.Jur. 74.
References: [1] Trusts, § 346; [2] Decedents' Estates,
[3] Decedents' Estates, § 1127; [4) Decedents' Estates,
[6-7] Trusts, § 92.
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of the corpus of the trust contraty to the express provisions
of the decree of distribution without any attempt to protect
the interests of the residuaty beneficiaries in that corpus and
without their consent, and contraty to the provisions of the
trust instrument.
(7) Id.-Expresa Trusta-lIocWlcation.-The mere decrease, since
execution of a will, of the income from securities distributed as
the corpus of a trust and a testator's expressed desire to provide adequately for the beneficiaries do not empower a court
to deprive residuaty beneficiaries of their interests in the
trust without their consent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County directing trustee to pay certain money from an
estate. Thomas C. Gould, Judge. Reversed.
William K. Young, Brady & Nossaman and Walter L.
Nossaman for Appellant.
Ben C. Cohen and Leonard Bartigan for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Florence Lenore Van Deusen by her will
dated June 20, 1932, left the residue of her estate to American
Security and Trust Company of Washington. D. C., as trustee,
for the following purposes: " ... to pay over the net income
arising therefrom, in equal shares, unto by aforesaid daugh.
ters.Gladys Van Deusen Bright and Hazel Van Deusen Lee,
during the period of their joint lives. and in case of the death
of either of them. then all of said net income unto the survivor,
for and during the natural life of the survivor. Upon the
death of the survivor of my said daughters. this trust shall
finally cease and determine. and my trustee shall thereupOb
transfer. assign and pay over the entire trust fund. including
any undistributed income. abRolutely and in fee simple. in
equal shares unto those of my grandchildren who may then
be living, the then surviving L'IS1le. however of any of. them
who may then be dead. t.o take. per stirpes, the same part or
share the deceased ancestor would have taken if living."
The testatrix died on April 10. 1944. and the will was admitted to probate on June 13, 1944. The named trustee declined to act, and Bank of America National Trust and
Savings Association was appointed a.dministrator·with·the·
will-annexed. On March 22. 1945, thp. dOllghtel'R of the testa·
trix, the life beneficiaries of the trust, filed a "Petition for
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to Trustee" with the probate court. The purpose
petiti(Jln was to have the trustee, when appointed, in1i"t:rrJicled to pay each of the life beneficiaries at least $200 a
out of income, if that was sufficient, but if not, out
corpus of the trust. It is aUeged in the petition that
made by the testatrix for her daughters was
to provide them with enough income to take care of
,::" ___ ~I- that it wa.~ contemplated at the time the will was
that the net income from the trust investments would
$400 a month, and that the testatrix intended that
than $200 a month would be available for each daughF'lrhlU!l" the trust. It is also alleged that since the creation
one of the daughters has been afflicted with a dishA11;mrM to be incurable and needs special medical care
the other daughter must rely entirely upon the iniiiIIiiI":hnm the trust for the necessities of life.
3. 1945. Bank of America Trust and Savings
_a.ti~m was appointed trustee, and by order for ratable
!'Hhl1tiCID' a part of the residue of the estate was distributed
On the same day the "Petition for DirectioJlt8
rftliiBt4!!e"" was denied. The order for ratable distribution
"The Trustee shall pay in equal shares to Gladys
Bright and Hazel Van Demen Lee during the
their joint lives, and in case of the death of either
"
to the survivor for and during the natural life
.......,;':Tn.., all of the net income arising from said trust

1;''IlJlreetlOJltS

:;.;00.',", _ _ _ ••_

death of both of decedent's daughters, said
distribute the corpus of the trust estate in equal
the grandchildren of decedent who may then be liv'·the event of any of said grandchildren not surhis or her share shall be distributed to his or
issue in equal shares and per stirpes, and
trust shall cease and terminate."
!.NP.nts!mlV>.l' 12. 1945. the probate court made its order
Fdiistribultio:n. distributing the balance of the residue
"in trust for the uses and purposes set forth in
for Ratable Di~ribution, dated April 3, 1945.... "
was taken from either order of distribution. RomeApril 3, 1945 (the record does not disclose the
order) a new trial was granted on the "Petition
'lftletiIOJlt8 to Trustee" and another hearing was held on
on February 14, 1946. On the basis of the rf\COrd
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at the original hearing on the petition, the court entered its
order granting the petition of the life beneficiaries for directions to the trustee to pay each of them at least $200 a month,
after a showing that the net income of the trust at that time
was sufficient to pay each beneficiary from $100 to $125 a
month only. This order was based on a finding by the probate court "that the main benefits under said trust were
intended for the petitioners herein who were the primary objects of the testatrix's solicitude and that the primary purpose
of the trust could not be accomplished by a strict adherence
to the terms of the declaration of the trust . . . and that it
is the purpose of said trust that the said petitioners herein
receive the sum of $200 each per month." From this order
the trustee, who appeared at the hearing in opposition to the
petition, appeals.
The trustee contends that the probate court was without
jurisdiction to make the order on the grounds that respondents' petition was not a proper petition under section 1120
of the Probate Code, that the new trial on the petition after
the final decree of distribution constituted a collateral attack
on the final decree of distribution, that the probate court was
without jurisdiction to modify the trust pursuant to section
1120, and that if the probate court had jurisdiction and the
matter was not conclusively determined by the final decree
of distribution, the probate court erred in ordering an invasion of the corpus of the trust contrary to the express
terms of the decree of distribution and of the will itself.
Probate Code section 1120 provides: "When a trust created
by will continues after distribution, the superior court shall
not lose jurisdiction of the estate by final distribution, but
shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of determining to
whom the property shall pass and be delivered upon final or
partial termination of the trust, to the extent that such determination is not concluded by the decree of distribution,
or settling the accounts and passing upon the acts of the
trustee and for the other purposes hereinafter set forth .
.Any trustee appointed by will, or appointed to execute a
trust created by will, may from time to time pending the
execution of his trust, or at the termination thereof, render
for settlement his accounts and report his acts as such trustee
before the Stlperior court in which the will was probated....
The trustee may also petition such court, from time to time,
for instructions as to the administration of the trust. ••• The

I
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shall cause notice of the hearing to be mailed to the
at their last known addresses.... "
been held that a beneficiary as well as a trustee may
the court for instructions to trustees pursuant to this
(Estate of Marre, 18 Ca1.2d 184, 186 (114 P.2d 586].)
never been decided, however, whether the petition
med before the appointment of a trustee and before
im:nti,1)Jl. It is clear that the section applies only to testathat continue after distribution. and most of
ftWlWdmlB expressly refer to action taken after distribuEstate of Smith, 4 Cal.App.2d 548. 552 [41 P.2d
. stated that "the language employed in the present
the Probate Code was intended to broaden the
of the probate court so as to give that court
over practically all controversies which might
liet'WeE!Il the trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries
trust." (Quoted with approval in Estate of Smead,
20,24 [82 P.2d 1821.)
is nothing in section 1120 that specifies that
. i$ling the petition. although it seems clear that it
. be heard and determined before the trustee is
has received distribution of at leastsom& of
(See Estate of Bey, 31 Cal.App.2d 648. 653 [88
The trustee contends that since the "trustee"
to man notiee to the beneficiaries, the petition
until a trustee is appointed who can carry out
. Since the clause providing for the petition has
. apply to petitions filed by beneficiaries, although
refers only to a petition of trustees (Estate of
there is no reason why the petitioning benenot satisfy the notice requirements of the
:4J:tn()UA~ the petition was filed before the decree of
before the appointment of a trustee, its prayer
lINeti4)ns to the trustee that the court appoints, and it
. the appointment of the trustee and the order
and the trustee appeared to contest
of the relief sought. The probate court had
hear the petition at that time.
contends that the orders of distribution were
r'Col[lcl,18i~re with respect to respondents' rights under
that the probate court had no power to grant a
the petition thereafter. [2] With ~pect to

,,,,,.~]~es
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the construction of the will, the decree of distribution was
clearly conclusive as to the rights of the beneficiaries to an
invasion of the corpus. By the order for ratable distribution
of April 3, 1945, incorporated in the decree of final distribution of September 12, 1945, the probate court directed that the
net income be paid to respondents and that the corpus be
distributed to the grandchildren of the testatrix on the death
of the surviving life beneficiary. A decree of distribution is a
t1nal and conclusive construction of the will as against all
interested parties, including beneficiaries of a testamentary
trust. (Estate of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 428 [175 P.2d 524];
Estate of Easter, 24 Ca1.2d 191, 194 [148 P.2d 601]; Prob.
Code, § 1021; cases collected 136 A.L.R. 1180, 1185.) "The
administration of a decedent's estate involves a series of
separate proceedings, each of which is intended to be final ...
not only as to the parties who appear therein, but also as to
all persons 'interested in the estate.' . . . In fact, it is undoubtedly because all such persons were to be bound by
various orders and decrees entered in the course of the administration of the estate. that the Legislature expressly
provided that they might appear and protect their rights in
the proceedings that lead to such orders and decrees. (See
Prob. Code, §§ 361,370,407.442,522,584, 681, 756, 810, 831,
841, 860, 921, 922, 927, 1000, 1010. ]020. ]200.)" (Estate 0/
Loring, supra, at p. 428.)
Among such proceedings are those for ratable distribution
(§ 1010) and final distribution (§ 1020). Any question of
construction of the will in favor of the respondents should
therefore have been determined either at the time of the order
for ratable distribution or the decree of final distribution.
The life beneficiaries. however, contend that the petition
was filed to obtain a modification of the trust to carry out
the actual intention of the testatrix rather than to obtain a
favorable construction of the will. That this is the theory
on which the order was granted is shown by the probate
court's t1nding after the new trial "that the primary purpose
of the trust could not be accomplished by a strict adherence
to the terms of the declaration of the trust expressed in said
last Will and Testament.... " [3a] The original order on
respondents' petition was one of denial and no appeal was
filed therefrom. Subsequently a new trial was granted on the i
petition, and the issue remainR whether the probate court bad .
jurisdiction to grant a new trial. Section 1231 of the Probate
II:
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. lists the cases in which a probate court has jurisdiction
. . a new trial: "A motion for a new trial in probate
&0CE!edin8:S can be made only in cases of contests of wills,
or after probate, in proceedings to determine
and interests in estates, and in those cases where the
fact, of which a new trial is sought, were of such
as to entitle the parties to have them tried by a jury
or not they were so tried."
pr;ooeedllllg involved in the present case was not a will
Nor was it a proceeding under the second category
in section 1231. The phrase "Proceedings to deterjt:lleil~lp and interests in estates" refers to the special
ieeClinl~ under section 1080 of the Probate Code. Under
tiW!tiQ][l. "any person claiming to be an heir or entitled to
:unLjJo\J'U of any part of the estate of a decedent may file
in the pending probate proceedings to have the
°Ufllert.a.1n and declare the rights of himself and all others
iB~.-'.Y or any interest therein." (Trout v. Ogilvie, 41
167, 174 [182 P. 333}.) In such proceedings, howpetltlo,ner is not entitled to be heard unless he claims
heir, and when such a claim is made, "The court
j1lrisdiction to determine, and it is made its duty to
.' not alone the heirship to said deceased but the
each respective claimant to his estate." (In re
Cal. 689, 694 (45 P. 6}.)
. eategory specified in section 1231 of the Probate
.,"Those cases where the issues of fact, of which
is sought were of such a character as to entitle
to have them tried by a jury. . . ." [4] There
to demand a jury trial in a probate proceeding
is granted by statute. (Estate of England,
300 [5 P.2d 428]; Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538,
246].) If it is assumed therefore that the new
:~an1;ed on an issue of fact, namely, the purpose and
testatrix in executing the trust provisions of
question remains whether there is a statute pro, .a right to a jury trial of that issue in a proceeding
section 1120 of the Probate Code. If there is any
au:thOlrlt:y for a jury trial in such a case, it must be
Uf·ltt:CI.1UlJ.lS 1230 and 1233 of the Probate Code. Section
that" All issues of fact joined in probate prolI!8-:mUl!lt be tried in conformity with the requirements of
l)nLetlI~e in civil actions. The party affirming is plain°
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ti« and the one denying or avoiding is defendant." Section
1233 provides that "the provisions of Part 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure . • . constitute the rules of practice in the
proceedings mentioned in this code with regard to trials.••."
It was held 1Ulder former sections 1713 and 1716 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, on which these sections are based, that a
party to a probate proceeding had a right to demand a jury
trial if there is a statutory authority for the formation of issues
of fact on the issue joined. (Bstat. of Baird, 173 Cal. 617,
620 [160 P. 1078].) This rule has been applied 1Ulder the
Probate Code to an issue of fact raised 1Ulder Probate Code
section 1020 authorizing an interested party to resist the applieation for a decree of distribution. (Estat. of P.rki"", 21
Ca1.2d 561, 567 [134 P.2d 231].) Section 1120, however,
makes no provision for such issues of fact and it has been
held that there is no right to a jury trial and therefore no
right to a new trial in proceedings there1Ulder to settle the
accounts of a testamentary trustee. (E.tat. of Smead, 12
Cal.2d 20, 24 [82 P.2d 182].) Moreover, even if there were
such a right to a jury trial, the analogous eivil action 1Ulder
section 1230 would be an action by the respondents against the
trustee and the remaindermen to determine the extent of their
rights in the trust. Such an action in equity does not give
the parties a right to a jury trial. (Cau1uJp. v. S.curity Sooing. Bank, 127 Cal. 197, 201 [59 P.2d 589].)
[Sb] Since Probate Code section 1231 provides the only
authority for the granting of new trials in probate proceedings and does not authorize the granting of a new trial in a
proceeding such as the present one, the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to make the order appealed from. (DitJmond v.
Superior Courl,189 Cal. 732, 740 [210 P. 36].)
Even if it be assumed that the probate court had jurisdiction to grant a new trial on respondent's petition for instructions to the trustee, the order appealed from is erroneous on
its merits. The theory of the order, and the only basis for
granting it after the decree of distribution, was to allow a
/ modi1ieation or deviation from the trust to earry out the purI pose of the testatrix in view of changed conditions. [0] A
court of equity may modify a trust on a proper showing of
changed conditions oceurring after the creation of a trust if
the rights of aU the beneficiaries may be protected. (Whittingham v. California f'f'UBt Co., 214 Cal. 128, 134 [4 P.2d
142]; Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal.2d ·352, 358 [101 P.2d 4841;
Jlo~ v. f'ifle I'MUNnu " f'f'Wf Co., 27 Cal2d 457, 466-
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P.2d 15J; see Rest. Trusts, §§ 167, 168; Scott on
11167, 168.) [6] If it is assumed that a probate
the same power under section 1120, the order apis nevertheless erroneous, since it provides for
fi'f:asi(m of the corpus of the trust contrary to the express
of the decree of distribution without any attempt
the interests of the residuary beneficiaries in that
..w".;._' interest given respondents in either the will or the
distril~ution is the net income from the corpus. The

I

/

itfe1trlldren of the testatrix, ehildren of the respondents,
,.titled to distribution of the corpus on the death of the
'respondent. To allow an invasion of the corpus
. .' consent of the residuary beneficiaries contrary
Dro~,ons of the trust instrument is to take property
lblet,'Wiithc)ut his consent and give it to another. (See 3
I" SDlP8l~ Trusts and Trustees, 504.) As stated in the
IIPILen, of Trusts (§ 168, comment d.) "The court will
, direct the application of the principal to the
~'tlldllLcatjon of one beneficiary where by the terms of
t:DlLcoDle only is to be so applied, if the result would
l8Dl!'iVe another beneficiary of property to which he is
beCc)1l1e entitled by the terms of the trust, whether the
.. such other beneficiary is vested or contingent, or
. other beneficiary consents to such application."
"Hug""" v. Pederal Trust Co., 119 N.J.Eq. 502,
2991; Scott on Trusts, § 168.)
nfffl1~1I~m 'f. California Trust Co., 214 Cal. 128, 134
. the claimant, a beneficiary of a testamentary
"= ...=._ only person interested in the estate. It was
of equity could modify the trust to allow
part of the corpus to the beneficiary on a
of the beneficiaries' need therefor and of
l,Wms1tancee occurring since the execution of the
present case, the respondent life beneficiaries
'only persons interested in the trust, and the
residuary beneficiaries must be protected. The
contend, however, that the probate court did
protect the interests of the residuary beneficiaries,
trustee had no right to attempt to do so, since
~idwlLry beneficiaries were all served with notice
of the petition and two of them, who appeared
~~.ec:runseI, stated that they had no objection to inpqmeuta to $150. This can llard1¥ be eon-
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sidered consent by all the residuary beneficiaries to an invasion of the corpus of the trust to provide each of the life
beneficiaries with at least $200 a month.
Moreover, in Estate of Markham, 28 Ca1.2d 69, 74 [168 P.2d
669], it was held by this court that where the trust instrument provides for payments to a life beneficiary out of net
income, there may be no invasion of the corpus or of accumulated income "in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary in the trust instrument." The respondents contend
that the rule of the Markham case is confined to a situation
where there is a fully expressed plan or purpose set forth in
the trust instrument and that in the present case there was
no plan or purpose shown by the will itself. Even if this
limitation of the rule might be applied in a proper case,
respondents have failed to show by parol evidence or otherwise that the testatrix clearly intended an invasion of the
corpus, if necessary, to provide each of the daughters with
an income of $200 a month.
[7] The conditions as to the health and need of the respondents were stipulated to by the trustee at the hearing.
The only other evidence of changed conditions after the
execution of the will in 1932 is that the income from the
securities that were distributed as the corpus of the trust decreased sometime between 1932 and the date of the original
hearing on the petition. The evidence introduced by respondents consisted only of the testimony of the husband
of one of the life beneficiaries that he was the financial
adviser of the testatrix, that at the time of the execution of
the will in 1932, the testatrix received $400 a month income
from the securities in question; that at that time she told the
witness that she expected that her daughters would receive
a similar income therefrom under the trust. The witness
also testified that in 1943, the testatrix stated in a letter
that "I wW arrange it so that it will be used to the advantage of Gladys and Hazel [the respondents], no others."
(Italics added.) He also testified that the testatrix did
made a statement· "with respect to seeing that her children
were not impoverished as a result of illness or any unforeseen
contingencies." (Italic.'~ added.) This evidence, whether admissible or not, shows only that in 1932 the testatrix expected
the income from her securities to remain at approximately
$400 a month after her death and that in 1943 she contemplated changing her will to provide Rolely for her daughters.
Nevertheless the will admitted to probate provided for her

JOt Shenk, JOt Edmonds, Jo, Carter, Jo, Schauer,
t::5p1ence, Jo, concurred.
petition for a rehearing was denied July

